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ABSTRACT	  
	  
The Yellow River Basin Commission (YRCC) is struggling with demand and supply 
water imbalances due to inter-jurisdictional rivalries, and has consequently promoted 
the development of water rights trading to incentivize provinces from not exceeding 
their allocated withdrawals in the Yellow River Basin (YRB). This thesis employs the 
case of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to examine factors that facilitate or hinder 
market-based water rights allocation in the YRB. By reviewing scholarly literature, 
governmental reports and conducting interviews with governmental officials and water 
rights experts, it argues that two features of China’s water resource management shape 
water markets in Ningxia: asymmetric information and lack of coordination 
mechanisms. The flaws in the performance of Ningxia’s water rights transfer system – 
including inconsistency and lack of integration between the Yellow River Water 
Allocation Plan and abstraction permits; little consideration to groundwater and 
surface water linkages – stems from asymmetric information on hydrology and 
abstraction licenses and absence of formal mechanisms for cross-sectoral coordination. 
As economic development proceeds in the western interior regions along the Yellow 
River Basin, the pressure to reallocate water between agriculture to industry through 
inter-sectoral water trading will increase. Consequently, trade-offs between energy vs 
food production, higher-value use vs equity & environmental flows as a result of 
tradable water rights is to some degree inevitable; however, collective action 
challenges of exclusion and coordination tied to mitigating these tensions will put the 
existing institutional framework governing water rights under growing pressure. 
	  
Keywords: Water markets, institutions, central-local relations, water management, 
Yellow River Basin, water-energy nexus 
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GLOSSARY	  OF	  TERMS	  
	  
Consumption	  Volume	  –	  The net amount of water extracted from a river or aquifer. 
 
Transfer	   –	  a change to the holder of a water right, whether by agreement between 
two parties, or compulsory reallocation done by government. 
 
Water	   Abstraction	   –	  The total water diverted from the river, lake or underground 
body. 
 
Water	   Abstraction	   Permit	   –	   Permission to take water. The Water abstraction 
License is the official certificate for water abstraction. 
 
Water	  Abstractor	  –	  The unit or individual who takes water from the river, lake or 
groundwater body, either for their own use or to deliver it to other water users. 
 
Water	   Resouces	   Allocation	   Plan	   –	   A plan prepared by a water administrative 
department or river basin authority to define the water available to administrations and 
users below that agency for a period of years into the future. 
 
Water	  Right	  –	  Any entitlement of a region, unit or indidual to water. Includes: rights 
to allocate water and to take water; long-term rights to water as well as the water 
available during a year or season; includes rights under a permit as well as statutory 
rights such as those of agricultural collectives. 
 
WUA	  –	  Water User Assocation 
 
YRB	  –	  Yellow River Basin 
 
YRCC	  –	  Yellow River Basin Commission 
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1.	  INTRODUCTION	   
This thesis will start with introducting the research problem that the thesis 
investigates. Following, it moves on to present the aim and purpose of the thesis as 
well as the social and scientific relevance of the study. 
 
1.1	  Problem	  Statement	   
Empirical study reveals that market-based instruments are often not sufficiently 
effective to induce changes in water use behavior at the local level in China. 
Instruments, such as licensing of water rights and levying charges for possessing these 
rights, are modified and filtered by institutionalized practices leading to weak policy 
implementation on the ground (Wei et al., 2011). At the heart of central-local relations 
lies the enforcement-gap between centrally determined policy targets and effective 
local policy implementation (Schröder 2011:27 ). In a vast country like China, where 
concrete measures for financing and meeting central targets are left to local 
administrations, raises the question of how can the central government create market-
based solutions to its water shortages to induce local compliance and avoid excessive 
water withdrawals? 
 
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) exemplifies the challenge of incentivize local 
governments to adhere to national water quotas. Several provinces in the Yellow River 
Basin, including Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, have exceeded the water quota allocated 
when the Yellow River Water Allocation Plan was issued (Wang 2012). Compounding 
the water challenge is the fact that energy is vital to extract, treat, distribute & supply 
water and water is essential for energy extraction, processing and production (Olsson 
2012:3-4). Along the YRB, the three provinces in China with biggest coal reserves, 
namely Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia account for more than half of the total 
national coal output and 16 % of thermal power generation, but only have 3 % of 
national water resources (Anadon & Zhang 2013:3). Therefore, possibilities for water 
use efficiency through inter-sectoral and up- and downstream water allocations have 
been seen as ways of coping with the new industrial demands for water (Jia et al., 
2008). One option to hold off the confrontation between scarce water resources and 
growing coal-based industrial sector in Ningxia and Inner Mongolia is “an investment 
for water saving and water rights transfer measure” sanctioned by the Ministry of 
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Water Resources and the Yellow River Basin Commission (YRCC). It is regarded as a 
win-win game, not only solving the water demand of new industries, but also 
promoting the water efficiency of agricultural water use. Since 2003 more than two 
dozen cases of water rights transfer1 occurred where water is being reallocated from 
agriculture to industry through irrigation efficiency, generally by reparing canal lining. 
While on paper the framework for water right allocation is comprehensive, research in 
Inner Mongolia has shown that in practice, ecological impacts and limited stakeholder 
involvement, undermine its strenght and effectiveness (H. Zheng et al., 2009:376). 
This study, by looking at water rights transfer projects in Ningxia, seeks to fill a void 
in the literature: there are studies of water rights trading with transaction costs in the 
YRB (Wang 2012) and case-studies of water rights trading in Hangjin district, Inner 
Mongolia (Hang et al., 2009), but none – in the english academic literature – 
specifically focus on Ningxia. 
 
1.2.	  Aim	  and	  Purpose 
China’s rapidly rising need for energy is restrained not only by the threats of climate 
change but also scarce water resources. Market mechanisms are regarded as a crucial 
component to enhance efficient water use. The purpose of this study is to examine 
factors that facilitate or hinder market-based water rights allocation in the YRB. 
 
1.3.	  Research	  Questions 
Following the problem statement and the aim of the thesis I analyze the application of 
market-based instruments in Ningxia by looking at water rights transfer. My main 
research questions are: 
 
(1) How does a normative solution to water rights transfer look like? 
 
(2) How do formal institutions in China and Ningxia regulate water right transfers? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The role of government has played an important role in the previous reallocation of water rights in China 
compared to a pure market-based approach. Thus, in this thesis the phrase ”water transfer” is used rather than 
”water trading”. 
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(3) What are the current problems and potential solutions to water rights transfer in 
Ningxia? 
 
1.4	  Thesis	  Structure 
Following the introduction of the thesis research problem, chapter 2 justifies the thesis 
by identifying a empirical gap and how the thesis contributes to current research. 
Subsequently, chapter 3 presents the chosen methodology and the reasons for it. 
Chapter 4 gives a in-depth understanding of water markets and the institutional 
dimension of water markets in China drawing from New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which serves to form my theoretical framework. Chapter 5 presents the 
empirical findings from Ningxia province. Finally, chapter 6 analyses the collected 
data and answers the three research questions before highlighting the implications the 
finding have on the future of water rights trading in the Yellow River Basin. The thesis 
concludes in chapter 7. 
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2.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This chapter gives a overview of water markets research in China concerning water 
rights trading in order to identify a research gap.	  
 
2.1.	  Research	  on	  Water	  Markets	  in	  China  
Market-based water transfers have since 1980s been gradually developed and the 
number (and volume) of water transfers within and between sectors are expected to 
increase manifold in the future (Varghese 2013:3). While water rights market in theory 
has a lot of potential, in practice there exist various factors which constrain the 
applicability of market-based water-trading as a response to water scarcity. In China, 
the YRB has been the site of several water rights transfer initiatives since 2003 with 
the common characteristic of ”investing in channel lining and transferring water 
rights”, creating water savings which were allocated on an administrative basis to 
industries. The grant of water rights at the farmer level for undertaking water rights 
trading has also been practiced but occured to a limited extent to date because it is still 
unclear how water trade should be established and implemented. Research emphasis 
that factors such as incremental licensing, poorly specified entitlements, limited 
recognition of environmental flows, and a lack of security of entitlement and 
restrictions on transferring water rights undermine the certainty, security and 
sustainability of the water rights system (Speed 2009:396). One important factor that 
has been emphasized in many studies to constrain water rights trading is transaction 
costs (Wang 2012; Zhang 2007; Zhang et al., 2009).  
 
Wang’s (2012) results from simultation of water markets with transaction costs in the 
YRB show that the potential benefits from the trans-jurisdictional water markets are 
considerable in the condition of zero transaction costs, and the benefits increase with 
the decrease of transaction costs. Moreover, the results imply that the inter-sectoral 
market between agricultural and industrial actors has a larger potential and tolerance 
capacity for transaction costs than the development of trans-jurisdictional water 
trading within the agricultural sector. Since the industrial actors are less sensitive to 
the transaction costs because of higher economic returns from the water use and 
greater capacity to pay various costs, the water trading between the industrial and 
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agricultural sectors is more feasible and more likely market form in the future, which 
explains why transfers have been conducted in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. 
 
In this context, research from the channel lining and water rights trading programme in 
Hangjin, Inner Mongolia has shown that the irrigation water that has been traded to 
downstream factories has helped alleviate the water shortages experienced by industry, 
and has also helped reduce the burden of farmers by saving water and reducing farm 
costs. Farmer’s costs have reduced because they dont have to pay for water losses in 
the channels that deliver water to the point where water user associations (WUAs) 
make bulk purchases on behalf of the farmers they represent. However, H. Zheng et al. 
(2009) also highlight problems:  
 
• Decline in agency income: as less water needs to be delivered to farmers 
following canal lining, water ticket sales and revenue has declined for the 
Hangjin Irrigation Management Bureau. 
 
• Possible third party impacts: the transfer may affect users outside the district 
by reducing leakage and hence groundwater recharge. 
 
• Irrigation remains inefficient: although the water efficiency between sectors 
has improved, the water rights transfer has not led to more ”crop per drop” 
within the district by farmers. 
 
• Water rights within the district remain ambiguous: the YRCC has clearly 
defined water abstraction permits to Hangjin irrigation district but water rights 
to WUAs and farmers within them are not. 
 
• Monitoring is rudimentary: water monitoring is based on equipment and 
method used in the 1950s and recording is carried out by hand.  
 
Speed’s (2009) findings on transferring and trading water rights in China suggest that 
many problems are rooted to the importance of clearly defined rights and the systems 
that govern them. Speed’s research summarizes these barriers to the applicability of 
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water rights trading in the YRB: ”Despite efforts since the introduction of the 2002 
Water Law, water rights in most cases in China are not well established at the 
regional, abstractor, or farmer level. Rights have often not been granted at all, and 
where they have, the rules surrounding the rights are often ambiguous” (Speed 
2009:276). Both Speed’s (2009) and H. Zheng et al. (2009) academic reports are the 
result of the Water Entitlements and Trading (’WET’) Project undertaken under the 
auspices of the Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the 
Arts and the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources in 2006. The final report 
”Development of Water rights and Trading in the People’s Republic of China” for the 
WET project aimed at reviewing existing arrangements and ongoing developments 
related to water rights in China to provide recommendations on a framework for water 
entitlements and trading that could be implemented across China (WET 2006:5).  
 
Based on site investigations in Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
and Inner Mongolia regions and Tianjin Municipality, the report found that the 
existing legal, institutional and management arrangements are solid for establishing a 
water rights system but several shortcomings taken in implementing water rights 
hamper its function. Problems such as unclear roles of different governments, poor 
connections within water management system, lack of definition & security and 
certainty of rights, not all water & water users captured, no trading framework, limited 
recognition of environmental needs, limited rights of farmers, limited system 
capabilites, limited transparency & public participation, and absence of a framework 
has led to wide regional variation for how water rights are assigned and managed 
(Ibid). In the case of Ningxia, the report found that 3 pilot projects had been 
implemented between irrigation districts and industries at abstractor and not farmer-
level. Furthermore, the findings suggest that groundwater is not closely managed and 
therefore raised concerns over groundwater and surface water linkages during water 
rights transfers. Conclusions from the site-investigation in Ningxia also emphasized 
the importance of developing a method to link consumptive water resource allocation 
plans to water abstraction permitting as a basis for water-rights trading in China 
(Ibid:164). 
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2.1.	  Thesis	  Contributions	  
This thesis advances empirical research on water markets in China in three ways. 
Existing research tend to emphasize property rights and transaction cost of water 
markets, rather than the role of political relationships and institutions which shape 
market-based water rights allocation in the YRB. Yet because of China’s centralized 
political system and decentralized market-economy, the role of governments and 
institutions in establishing and maintaining a framework for effective market-based 
instruments at the micro-macro level are key to understanding Ningxia’s transfer 
schemes toward meeting the challenge of water scarcity in the YRB. Secondly, though 
scholars have paid attention to issues related to efficiency, equity and sustainability 
they don’t address their tradeoffs. Furthermore, despite that the water-energy nexus is 
at the heart of China’s future water challenge where the water footprint of energy 
development and the energy footprint of water are large and growing, the linking of 
our two most precious resources have been overlooked in previous studies on water 
markets and water rights transfer schemes. In this light, the energy sector is a major 
user of water resources: energy production is responsible for 61.4 billion m3 water 
withdrawals, 10.8 billion m3 water consumption and 5.0 billion m3 wastewater 
discharges in China, which are equivalent to 12.3 %, 4.1 % and 8.3 % of the national 
totals, respectvely (Anadon & Zhang 2013:1). According to the 12th five year (2011-
2015) development plan, total capacity of coal-based thermal power is expected to 
reach 0.93 TW in 2015 and 1.17 TW in 2020, compared with 0.71 TW in 2010 
(Ibid:15). Stimulated by the impulse of promoting local economic development, local 
governments in coal production provinces in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia are, 
however, subject to the constraints of water resources. This raises a key question: how 
can the national government enjoy the benefits of decentralization by driving 
provinces in the Yellow River Basin to expand coal-production for satisfying 
increasing national energy demand while at the same time keeping localities under 
check for not exceeding water limits set out in the Yellow River Water Allocation 
Plan? 
 
Against this background, this study seeks to advance understanding of what factors 
facilitate or constrain the applicability of market-based instruments to enhance 
8 
efficient water use in Ningxia province where climate change and energy are major 
components of YRB’s water scarcity challenge. By studying transfer schemes in a 
transitional country, this thesis will shed light on what can be learned from Ningxia’s 
experience with market-based instruments with the aim to improve water resource 
management in the YRB. 
 
 
3.	  RESEARCH	  DESIGN	  
This chapter presents the ontological and epistemological foundation of this study, 
motivates a qualitative approach and discusses the implications for the chosen 
research method. Finally, I discuss data collection, generalizability and ethical 
considerations.	  
	  
3.1.	  Ontological	  and	  Epistemological	  Considerations 
My research on water markets in the YRB takes its ontological and epistemological 
point of departure in critical realism, yet it deploys an interpretivist methodology. For 
critical realists, reality – such as water resources in the YRB – exists independently 
from researchers ideas and descriptions of it. However, reality does not just consist of 
material objects but ideas and discourses embedded in the management of the YRB 
that can explain responses to water scarcity in the YRB. Therefore, as a critical realist 
I share the interest of positivism in the objective world, patterns, generalization and in 
finding causalities, but I also diverge from this tradition to reduce the world to 
observable objects and facts outside the subjective domain (Alvesson & Sköldberg 
2009:40). In contrast to establish predictable patterns and the exact relation between 
cause and effect, critical realism emphasizes the ideal and possibility of causal 
explanation (Ibid:42). More importantly, this thesis does not seek to find a reality that 
can be regarded as definite but rather to interpret contingent factors – such as 
transaction costs, property rights and institutions - that shape transferring and trading 
water.  
 
3.2.	  Qualitative	  Research 
Since the purpose of the study is to employ the case of Ningxia to examine factors that 
facilitate or hinder market-based water allocation in the YRB, I have adopted a 
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qualitative approch which uses semi-structured interviews. It is theory-driven in nature 
and seeks to evaluate water transfer practices against the backrop of a normative 
solution to the problem, namely promoting water-use efficiency for both agriculture 
and industry under unified management. As such, neoliberal theories rests on the 
assumptions that individuals have perfect information about the market, and that there 
are no transaction costs of exchange. Often, these assumptions are not met in reality. 
This thesis, therefore, expands the analysis beyond a neoliberal economics approach 
by including transaction costs theory, property rights theory and collective action. 
Developing an institution-based theoretical framework is a sensible approach to 
explain the challenges and opportunities of market-based water-allocation in the YRB 
and specifically in the case of Ningxia.	  
Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with an open framework, which can 
provide insights into how participants view the water rights transfers. By using semi-
structured interviews I can ask supplementary questions, deepen the discussion and 
adjust the emphasis in the research as a result of significant issues that emerge in the 
course of interviews (Bryman 2012:470). Primary data was obtained in semi-
structured interviews with governmental officials and water experts who I selected 
based on recommendations coming out of the snowball process. From February 27th to 
April 2th 2014, I carried out fieldwork in Beijing, Henan and Ningxia provinces where 
I conducted seven semi-structured interviews. Most of the interviews were done in 
English, except two interviews with officials from Ningxia Water Resources 
Department that were conducted in Chinese together with an interpreter from Ningxia 
University. All the interviewees wished to remain anonymous, except for a water 
expert from China Academy of Sciences. They are:  
Mr. Jia Shaofeng (Chinese Water Resources Management Expert, Professor, Institute 
Of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research CAS),                                   
Anonymous researcher (Chinese Water Rights Expert, Professor and Vice Dean, 
Tsinghua University),   
Anonymous researcher (Chinese Water Resources Management Expert, Professor, 
China Institute of Water resources and Hydropower Research),                           
Anonymous official (International Cooperation, Science and Technology, YRCC),     
Anonymous official (Department of Water Resources Management and Regulation, 
YRCC),                                                                                                              
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Anonymous official (Ningxia’s Department of Water Resources Governance),             
Anonymous official (Water Saving Office at Ningxia’s Water Resources Department)  
 
Information from the interviewees were supplemented with secondary data from 
governmental reports, scholarly literature and news-reports. The rationale for a 
heterogeneous sample or triangulation is to employ maximum diverse variation in 
opinions to converge lines of inquiry (Creswell 2007:127-128; Yin 2009:98).  
 
3.3.	  Selection	  of	  Case 
Given that the thesis is based on water rights transfers in Ningxia, this thesis employs 
a qualitative case study research method that ”investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (Yin 2009:18). In this context, a 
”multiple case study” is preferable where the focus is on one issue (e.g. water rights 
transfer) but where I select 8 pilot projects within a single province, namely Ningxia, 
to illustrate the issue (Creswell 2007:74). My selection of eight pilot-projects in 
Ningxia is based on three factors: a topical concern with illustrating market-based 
mechanisms to address water-shortages, a methodological concern with advancing 
social scientific thinking on conducive factors and constraints in establishing water 
markets, and a practical concern for collecting data, as these cases in Ningxia have not 
– to the author’s knowledge – been previously described in english academic 
literature. Even if there are quantitative studies showing that market-based instruments 
– such as water abstraction policies – are not working at the local level due to 
governance failure, the institutional heterogeneity in China makes it difficult in 
pinpointing out underlying factors why market-based instruments fail or not. 
Therefore, this study eliminates institutional differences by looking at eight pilot 
projects undertaken in a single province, Ningxia.  
	  
3.4.	  Validity	  and	  Reliability 
Recognizing that complete objectivity is impossibe in social research, critical realism 
emphasizes the importance of multiple measures and observations to address validity 
and reliability. In this light, I have collected multiple forms of data, which include 
triangulating data from several sources to ensure greater confidence in my findings. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure good linkage between my findings and the 
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perspectives of participants I revisited interviewees to confirm or correct statements. 
To ensure credibility and being transparent in my findings I have quoted extensively 
from the interviews so that the reader can follow that my research has been carried out 
according to good practice. 
 
3.5.	  Generalization	  
Social science, according to Flyvbjerg (2006), ”has not succeeded in producing 
general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to 
offer than concrete, context dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg 2006:223). In this light, 
this case-study aims to contribute to context-dependent knowledge by producing 
knowledge that can provide lessons to build on. Conducive factors and constraints in 
establishing a water rights transfer system in Ningxia can draw out lessons rather than 
proofs to other provinces in the YRB that seek to rely more on the market to reallocate 
water from agriculture to industry. 
	  
3.6.	  Ethical	  Considerations 
Ethical dilemmas are embedded in interviews with the concepts of relationships and 
power between me as a researcher and my respondents (Orb et al., 2001:93). Orb et 
al., (2001) note that researchers negotiate access to participants to collect information 
and the quality of the interactions between researchers and the participants may 
facilitate or inhibit access to information (Ibid:94). Therefore, I attached great 
importance to encourage disclosure, trust and awareness of ethical issues to my 
respondents. In order to ensure ethical responsibility in qualitative research, an 
informed form2 with questions was presented to interviewees prior to conducting an 
interview where I declared the purpose of my research and anonymity was guaranteed. 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Appendix. 
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4.	  CONCEPTUAL	  BACKGROUND	  AND	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK 
This chapter provides the reader with concepts essential to understand water markets 
and their implementation, and goes on to discuss the economic rationale behind 
market-based water-allocation. Subsequently, I discuss conducive factors and 
constraints for water markets highlighted in the literature and place it within China’s 
water resources management context. Finally, I develop a analytical framework 
drawn from New Institutional Economics (NIE) that is beneficial for identifying 
strengths and limitations in Ningxia’s water rights schemes. 
 
4.1.	  Concept’s	  in	  Water	  market	  literature 
Institutions  
Institutions are defined as the ”humanly devised constraints, formal (rules, laws, 
constitutions) and informal (norms of behavior, conventions and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics” (North 1990). Institutions play a 
major role in determining economic and political development of a society. 
Private	  property	  rights 
Water rights, defined as the rights and restrictions over the use of particular water 
resources, are pivotal for the establishment of tradable water rights to allocate water 
within and across sectors. The effectiveness of property rights depends, however, on 
the extent to which they can be defined, established, transferred and maintained. 
Strength and security of property rights therefore hinges on relationships between 
individual rights holders and the institutions that back up those claims (Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2013:26). Moreover, rights can be backed by diverse institutions – state, 
customary, religious laws or other normative principles – and how effective these 
claims are depend on recognition of rights through internalized legitimacy or external 
enforcement (Ibid). However, each property rights system – whether it is private, 
common property or state ownership – have strengths and weaknesses and even if they 
are defined and enforced properly they cannot resolve all problems related to 
inefficiency or disputes (Maestu et al., 2013:5). For instance, water resources can be 
conducive to management via private property rights to facilitate the reallocation of 
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water to higher-value uses. One the other hand, access to water is also a human right 
and its allocation cannot be solely basked on market principles if this excludes social 
groups from accessing water. 
 
Transaction	  cost’s 
High transaction costs discourage trades and are an important factor in restraining 
water rights trading. Whether market or non-market, transaction costs are high for any 
reallocation process due to the complex effects of one persons water use on others and 
could be large enough to block market-pricing or tradable water rights in many cases 
(J.Zhang et al., 2009:96). In this context, Garrick et al (2013) broadly refer transaction 
costs to the resources required to: 
 
(1)  ”define, establish, transfer and maintain property rights”. This definition focuses  
on costs of information, bargaining and other costs associated with specifying 
contracts. 
 
(2)  ”address collective action challenges of exclusion and coordination in natural 
resource management”. This definition addresses costs of collective action challenges 
– exclusion and monitoring – tied to public goods and free-riding in the provision and 
maintenance of water infrastructure and freshwater ecosystem services. 
 
The first definition of transaction costs are broadly the costs of establishing a system, 
including information costs, bargaining and decision-making costs, contracting costs 
while the second definition are the costs of implementing a system, including 
monitoring costs, enforcement costs, etc (Garrick et al., 2013:196).  
	  
4.2.	  Water	  markets	  through	  A	  New	  Institutional	  Economics	  Approach 
Conducive	  factors	  and	  constraints	  for	  water	  markets 
The founding principle for water markets is based on the belief that tradable water 
rights give water a value and provide an incentive to use water more efficiently since 
water saved can be used to increase production or sold (Bjornlund & McKay 
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2002:771). However, market-based water trading will only achieve a socially optimal 
allocation of water if the following conditions hold: the market is highly competitive 
(individuals cannot control price), buyers and sellers exclusively enjoy and incur all 
benefits and costs associated with their decisions (no externalities, public goods), an 
efficient flow of market information (for example price) where the market does not 
have greater transaction costs than other allocation mechanisms (Maestu et al., 
2013:7). In reality, waters mobility and variability makes theoretical assumptions of a 
self-maintaining allocation-system with little need for government involvement 
unlikely to be fullfilled given costly exclusion and collective action to manage 
interdependent private (irrigation transfers) and collective (environmental flows) 
water-related goods (Garrick et al., 2013:196). Given that the Chinese government has 
taken an active role in facilitating the emergence of quasi water markets the neo-
classical economics assumption of water markets needs to be supplemented with an 
institutional dimension. 
A recent study by Grafton et al., (2010) employs an integrated framework to assess 
and compare the institutional foundations, economic efficiency and environmental 
sustainability of water markets in Australia, the western US, Chile, South Africa and 
China and found that effective institutional arrangements and allocative mechanisms 
are of importance for a well functioning water market. In this light, the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) provides a robust analytical framework for examining 
conducive factors and constraints for a water rights transfer market in Ningxia (See 
Table 1). The reasons for choosing the NIE approach are twofold: it draws knowledge 
from a number of schools of thoughts and is not constrained by the tools of any single 
analytical framework (Sharma 2012:41) which is beneficial for studying complex 
issues such as the development of water trading. Secondly, the flaws in the 
performance of Inner Mongolia’s water rights trading schemes, highlighted in the 
literature review, are attributable to the institutional arrangements under which water 
is managed. Failure to define and secure water rights to WUAs & farmers, lack of 
information and monitoring systems, and poor recognition of environmental flows are 
linked to NIE:s theoretical core derived from interrelated theories of transaction, 
property rights and collective actions that can help diagnose similar challenges in 
Ningxia. Based on the new institutional economists such as North (1990) on 
institutions, Williamson (1998) on transaction cost, Coase (1960) on property right’s 
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and Ostroms (1990) theory on collective actions, three components of the NIE 
approach are of importance to this study: transaction costs, property rights and 
collective actions. Contrary to the neo-classical economics tradition, the NIE 
recognises that rationality is bounded by time and information asymmetry, 
transactions are not costless and bargaining strengths are not always equal (Maziotis et 
al., 2013:4). As pointed out by North: ”we have incomplete information and limited 
mental capacity by which to process information...In such a world ideas and ideologies 
play a major role in choices and transaction costs result in imperfect markets” (North 
1993:1).  
Due to incomplete information, institutions are needed to reduce human uncertainty, 
reduce transaction costs and incentivise agents to act together in which cumulative 
experiences and collective learning are best utilized (Ibid:5). Thus, instituional 
arrangements are supposed to facilitate efficiency through low transaction costs and 
property rights. However, institutions are controlled by the will of those with 
bargaining strength which in turn is linked to water user’s economic strength and 
knowledge of and access to formal water organisations within the larger institutional 
framework (Jenks 2009:21). Institutions – such as WUAs – are made up of agents 
bounded together to create and implement water markets. Delegate rights and powers 
over water to WUAs at lower levels in a politico-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy shape markets. As the case of Inner Mongolia has shown, those with the 
bargaining strength shape the direction of economic change: farmers and WUAs dont 
have defined and secure entitlement and have to ’bid’ for water in negotations with 
IMB while the IMB and industrial enterprises are able to put the scarce water 
resources to highest-value use. 
Since it is important to have adequate information concerning water supplies and 
demands for water markets, clear legal rights over water to WUAs can play a pivotal 
role in providing such information and reduce transaction cost by creating a process of 
acceptable behavior which can improve the likelihood of a socially equitable 
redistribution of water (Dinar et al., 1999:103). At the same time, unclear and 
incomplete registry of water rights will not only fail to give the owner an incentive to 
improve the water resource consumption but also encourage the water rights holder to 
ignore social and other external costs. Failure to address externalities and potential 
damage to third parties claiming they have been damaged by a transfer raise 
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transaction costs and result in the over-utilization of the resource (Donoso 2013:126). 
As a result, property rights not only need to be well-defined to reduce transaction costs 
but are dependent on the effectiveness of the institutions that enforce the rights so that 
a new level of efficient equilibrium of resource-use can be achieved (Maziotis et al., 
2013:6). Other problems that raise transaction costs include the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure to transfer water among potential buyers. 
In summary, the NIE perspective sees competition over scarce resources driven by 
rationality not always as the best option for economic goods like water. Transaction 
costs stemming from production and information imperfection demands institutions to 
moderate information asymmetry and align incentives for effective water allocation 
through markets. On the other hand, the hierarchy of power in the institutional 
structure determines which and how transaction costs are borne by actors which shape 
the direction of economic markets (Jenks 2009:20). Difference in bargaining strength 
implies that enterprises vis-à-vis local governments can pull the teeth of water rights 
trading initiatives by not providing legal and enforcement support that end-users need 
to exercise rights efficiently. The next section discusses the theory of transaction costs 
and collective action in the Yellow River Basin to identify conducive factors and 
constraints embedded in China’s water management system which shape water rights 
markets. 
 
Transaction	  costs	  and	  collective	  action	  in	  the	  Yellow	  River	  Basin 
Ostrom’s theory of collective action (1990) highlights the impacts of transaction costs 
on the likelihood of effective collective action in common-pool resources, including 
the cost of exclusion, information, and collective action to establish, monitor and 
enforce boundaires (Garrick 2013:197). Factors include the number of people 
involved; heterogeneity of interests; rules governing decision-making; norms, trust and 
social capital; and degree of centralisation (and therefore degree capacity for local 
users to devise and change rules). Common pool resources in the Yellow River Basin 
which cross provincial boundaries are subject to externality problems and have been 
placed under regulation by the YRCC. In order to internalize external effects caused 
by multiple water uses in different jurisdictions, the central government has adopted 
several strategies for a unified approach to manage water resources in a river basin 
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context. The 2002 Water law is a signal of centralization of water resources 
management with the law providing that “the state shall exercise a water resources 
management system of a river basin management in conjunction with jurisdictional 
management” (Shen 2009:484). Additionally, the 2008 Water Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law also mandated water pollution control to be based on river basin and 
not provincial boundaries. However, these laws only refer to “voluntary mediation” 
and superior-level “administrative-handling” of disputes and doesn’t provide any 
formal inter-jurisdictional dispute resolution mechanism (Moore 2014). In pararell 
with the progression of establishing central control and supervision mechanisms, the 
development of a market-based water rights system is supposed to contain provinces 
attempt to to escape the centre’s water resource allocations in the YRB. A market-
based water rights trading scheme presupposes several factors, however, including that 
each transaction operates under a highly competitive market with an efficient flow of 
market information where individuals cannot control price. Yet two features of 
China’s water resources management deviate from these preconditions: information 
asymmetry and absence of coordination mechanisms (see Table 1). 
 
China’s water resources are governed by a dual leadership system (Figure 1). 
Formally, each level of government is hierarchically clearly defined, with core 
leadership at the top and individuals linked to vertical ministries that control units 
from the centre to the local level. In practice, however, this hierarchical chain of 
organization in the water management system is characterized by vertical and 
horizontal fragmentation. Horizontally, at every level of government several 
institutions are involved in water management. At the central level, the State Council 
play’s an overarching role through enactment of laws/regulations and supervising their 
implementation and coordination. Furthermore, the dual track system is replicated at 
the local (province, prefecture, county) level. Water resource bureaus at the provincial 
level and water affairs bureaus (WAB) at the prefecture level, which are overseen by 
MWR at the central level, are responsible for the administration of water rights, the 
planning and operation of water utilities, and the protection of water bodies on the 
basis of water function zones. Vertically, the existing regime of water resource 
management is mainly based on administrative boundaries of different levels of 
government rather than at the river basin level. Thus, the offices and agencies of the 
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two bureaucracies with the same administrative rank buji ?级 cannot issue binding 
order to each other. Individual functional units at the vertical chain receive 
administration guidance from their parent units above them; they are also subject to 
the leadership of the local governments to which they belong (Gang 2009:19). In all 
cases, it is the local government, not the higher levels of the water resources apparatus 
that provides local water bureaus with their annual budgetary funds. Thus, the ability 
of WABs to enforce laws is compromised by their dependency on local government 
for their authority and budget. Moreover, communication between functional units at 
the same territorial level is limited. For instance, the YRCC has no power to prevent 
provinces from exceeding the allocation of withdrawal quotas. In this light, Moore 
(2014) argues that China broadly lacks effective means to solve horizontal collective-
action problems between administrative units of equal rank and that provinces in the 
YRB have managed to exploit loopholes in the system of vertical control to pursue 
inter-regional competition for scarce water resources. 
 
As a result, the water resources allocation system that encompasses allocations at the 
river basin/regional level, at the abstractor & farmer level not only requires perfect 
coordination at the vertical and horizontal levels of government & ministries but also 
reliable hydro-ecological and water-use information which are detailed, costly to 
collect and difficult to analyze. When information about main streams, tributaries and 
groundwater are not clear, actors act under incomplete information which run counter 
to a functioning market where market participants have reliable information about 
prices, supply and demand. In addition, the three-tiered allocation system, which 
forms the basis for a water rights market, is guided by administrative rather than 
market forces. 
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Figure 1. China’s Water Management Apparatus                                                                                                      
Source: Modified from Chen Gang 2009:20 & Circle of Blue 
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Table 1. Analytical framework: Constraints on water rights trading     
Potential problem Mitigating strategy Ningxia   
incomplete or poorly defined 
water rights (1,2) 
register and secure water rights  1. How strong is the linkage of 
water allocation from the YRCC 
to the water permit at local level? 
    
2. Are water diversions to IMB, 
defined through permits issued by 
YRCC, clearly defined to WUAS?     
Lack of infrastructure (3) investment in infrastructure  3. Is there a flexible infrastructure 
that allows transfer of water use-
rights at low costs?     
    
Opposition from irrigation 
districts (4) 
strengthening and capacity-
building of WUAs  
4. What is the role of WUAs? Can 
farmers coordinate collective 
action through WUAs? 
      
Third party effects (5) compensate third parties financed 
with levies on transcation  
5. is there a compensation system 
in place? Is groundwater managed 
in conjunction with surface water 
when irrigation water is 
transferred to industries? 
  
    
Imperfect or asymmetric 
information about water transfer 
(6) 
strengthening and capacity 
building of WUAs, promoting 
stakeholder involvement 
6. Is there any framework 
established for the exchange of 
information, mutual monitoring 
and frequent interactions?                                               
Lack of coordination mechanisms 
(7) 
  7. Is there a 'unified management' 
approach to water rights transfer 
between the YRCC and Ningxia 
Water Resources Bureau? Is there 
lack of a institutional process 
within the YRCC? 
promoting stakeholder 
involvement 
    
        
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 
5.	  FINDINGS	  
This chapter presents the fieldwork findings from Ningxia. It starts with an overview of 
the Yellow River Water Resources Allocation plan and China’s water right’s system 
from both legal and institutional perspectives, followed by a brief general description 
of the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia. It then describe’s the current water rights 
and transfer framework and how it is working in practice in Ningxia. Subsequently, I 
use excerpts from the interviews to discuss opportunities and constraints for a water 
rights transfer framework in Ningxia. 
 
5.1	  Yellow	  River	  Water	  Resources	  Allocation	  and	  Regulation	  
Ningxia’s water rights transfer system has to be seen in light of (1) the Yellow River 
Water Resources Allocation Plan (Huanghe shuiliang fenpei fangan) ???????
?  and (2) the extent for transferring water rights under current planning and 
regulatory framework. The Yellow River Basin is located in semi-arid areas and flows 
through ten provinces with an average annual runoff of 58 billion m3. Beginning in the 
early 1980s, the conflicts between the limited availability of water resources and the 
expanding demand led the Central government together with the local governments to 
devise an inter-provincial water allocation plan in 1987 (Table 3).  The total available 
for allocation was determined 37 billion m3 by setting aside 21 billion m3 for sediment 
transportation (Shen et al., 2009:216). The water resources allocation plan for the 
Yellow River Basin then is the key regulatory instrument for determining the volume 
of water available for consumption, as well as for prescribing the environmental flows. 
However, the plan is usually prepared based on the expected water supplies for the 
year. This mean, for instance, that if the expected water availability for the year is 10 
% lower than the historical average water availability, the water allocation to each 
province will be 10 % smaller than the quantity assigned in the initial plan (Yang 
2008:270). Moreover, the framework for the allocation and management of the YRB is 
established by the 2002 Water law which provide that water resources are owned by 
the State with ownership exercised by the State Council on behalf of the people. 
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Table 2. Monthly Water Allocation Plan from the Yellow River (billion m3) 
Province Qinghai Sichuan Gansu Ningxia Inner 
Mongolia 
Shaanxi Shanxi Henan Shandong Hebei+Tianjin Total 
           
Water 
Allocation 
 
1.41 
 
0.04 
 
3.04 
 
4.0 
 
5.86 
 
3.8 
 
4.31 
 
5.54 
 
7.0 
 
2.0 
 
37.0 
Source: Gao et al., 2004. 
 
Under the 2002 Water Law, water resources in the Yellow River Basin are allocated 
at three connected levels: 
• Regional water rights – water within the river basin is allocated to Ningxia 
and at provincial-level water is prepared and implemented by Ningxia’s 
Water Resources Bureau and approved by Ningxia Government to 
prefectures, and prefecture-levels plans allocate water between counties. The 
allocation plan is based on water consumption for each province but 
provinces can abstract a larger volume if they return much of that to the river 
system (Ibid).  
• Abstractor rights – is managed through a water abstraction permit system 
where individual factories or irrigation district agencies that take water 
directly from rivers, lakes or underground sources must apply for a water 
abstraction permit that is granted by appropriate level of river basin or Water 
Resources Bureau’s (prov, pref or county). The State Council’s 2006 Water 
Abstraction Regulation requires that the grant of permits in Ningxia is 
consistent with the Yellow River Basin Allocation Plan (4 billion m3). More 
importantly, the Water Abstraction Regulation sets requirements when water 
permit can be transferred. Water rights transfer is allowed at the abstractor 
level only if the permit holder can demonstrate that water use has been 
reduced. For example, a permit holder can reduce water through adjustments 
to production or industrial structure, technology innovation or the promotion 
of water-saving measures (Speed 2009:272). In Hangjin Irrigation District 
(HID) in Inner Mongolia, the district’s abstraction permit used to be 410 
million m3. However, savings of 130 million m3 per year from canal lining, 
traded out of the irrigation districts to industries, has reduced the water 
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abstraction permit to the HID from 410 million m3 to 280 million m3 (Hang et 
al., 2009:375). Throughout this process, the industrial users involved in the 
canal lining got new water abstraction permits. 
• Certificate-level rights – granted to farmers within an irrigation district which 
represents each farmer’s share of the water available to the district under the 
irrigation district’s water permit.  The user-level rights are prepared and 
implemented by Irrigation District Management Bureau and approved by 
Water Resources Bureau at appropriate level (WET 2006:4). 
In reality, water transfers are possible between regions, between abstractors and 
between farmers but initiatives have not been conducted under a systematic framework 
and water rights in most cases are not well established. The challenge in the Yellow 
River Basin has been to grant abstraction permits without exceeding quotas set by the 
Yellow River Water Allocation Plan. Against this background, the Yellow River 
Water Resources Regulation from 2006 sets monthly allocations for each province 
(both an abstraction and consumption volume), reservoir release requirements in the 
upstream/midstream as well as required flows at the provinicial boundaries. 
 
5.2	  General	  Description	  of	  the	  Hui	  Autonomous	  Region	  of	  Ningxia	  
                     ”The Yellow River is the life-line for many provinces and its natural that localities ask for 
more water. But we cannot let them exceed the allocation limits so if they want to develop 
industries, they have to save more water.” (Official, International Cooperation, Science 
and Technology, YRCC, March 3th 2014) 
The Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia is located in the northwest part of China, 
upstream of Inner Mongolia and downstream of Gansu in the Yellow River Basin.3 
Ningxia is one of China’s underdeveloped minority autonomous regions where three 
quarters are arid with 4 billion consumptive allocation from the Yellow River. As of 
2014, 91 percent of the water in Ningxia is used for agriculture and industry and urban 
water use account for 6 and 3 percent of the regions’s water consumption respectively 
(Official, Water Saving Office at Ningxia’s Water Resources Department, Interview 
March 18th 2014). Currently, Ningxia’s recoverable coal reserves amount to 31.5 
billion tons, ranking 6th nationwide and highest per capita with Ningdong area in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Appendix 2.  
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eastern Ningxia producing majority of the coal output (Ibid). In this context, coal and 
minerals are the cornstones of the government’s ’Open Up the West Campaign’ (Xibu 
Da Kaifa) ?????  and the ’Send Western Electricity  
East Campaign’ (Xi Dian Dong Song) ???? to develop Ningxia through an 
extensive economic programme. However, water is a constraint for developing 
regional energy industries and Ningxia’s allocation of water from the YRCC (4 billion 
m3) was already fully committed. It was under such circumstances that led the YRCC 
to propose a programme involving the transfer of water rights in Ningxia: 
 
         ”Originally it was Inner Mongolia that initiatied the water rights transfer and this idea 
spread to Ningxia in the same time-period. They wanted to extract more water from the 
original water allocation plan but we thought their submitted plan would overuse water. 
Thus, we suggested Ningxia Province to consider the pilot programme of water rights 
transfer undertaken in Inner Mongolia. After that, Ningxia also initiated their pilot 
projects to let enterprises invest in projects to improve irrigation channels that reduce 
water waste which can be used for industrial production.” (Official, International 
Cooperation, Science and Technology, YRCC, March 3th 2014). 
	  
5.3	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  Framework	  
With the establishment of the water allocation plan for the Yellow River obtaining 
additional water within the basin is difficult for Ningxia. One option for new sources 
of water is in agricultural sector, since the potential for water saving is considered high 
given the low irrigation water use efficiency. For example, it takes 1 m3 to produce 
0.85 kg food and only 19 % of the main irrigation channels and 22 % of the 
distribution channels has been lined (Xue et al., 2009:416). With lower economic 
returns (0.97 yuan/m3) in agriculture than for the industrial water use (57.9 yuan/m3) 
(Wang 2012:180), it becomes a natural choice to reallocate water from agriculture to 
industry through ”investment for water saving and water rights transfer” measure. 
Since 2003, Ningxia’s Department of Water Resources Governance has overseen the 
programme in which water saved through canal lining in Qingtongxia ??? East 
Irrigation Area and West Irrigation Area is transferred to industries, with the cost of 
lining met by the industrial beneficiaries. The role of governments – both at central 
and local level – in establishing and maintaining a framework for water-rights transfer 
has consisted of: 
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• Enterprises submit proposal’s of their water requirements to Ningxia’s 
Department of Water Resources Governance which has the main responsibility 
for examining and approving applications for the pilot programmes; 
• Department of Water Resources Governance undertakes assessment with the 
Irrigation Bureau at Ningxia’s Water Resources Department. Depending on 
Ningxia’s development priorities successful applicancts are chosen by the local 
government of Ningxia. Construction of big industrial projects, such as power 
plants, needs final approval from the National Development and Reform 
Commission; 
• If canal lining can save water through investments by an enterprise and 
agreement is reached between an enterprise and the Department of Water 
Resources Governance the work is assessed by the YRCC; 
• The YRCC then confirm whether savings can be realized and is responsible to 
give the final water abstraction permit to the irrigation district. The water 
abstraction permit is then adjusted to the irrigation district and a new 
abstraction permit is given to the purchaser (enterprise). The water rights 
transfer is set for 25 years and for every 5 years the water abstraction permit 
has to be checked and approved by the YRCC. If the enterprise don’t reapply 
the water right, then it goes back to the original seller (Official, Ningxia’s 
Department of Water Resources Governance, Interview March 17th 2014; 
Speed 2009:274). 
Based on the ”Guidelines for the Water Rights Transfer of Main River of Yellow 
River in Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia and Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region” and the ”Implementation Method for Yellow River Water Rights Transfer” 
made by YRCC, Ningxia has developed the following principles for implementing the 
water rights transfer: 
• Gross volume control – the transfer must not result in the 4 billion 
consumptive allocation from the Yellow River being exceeded; 
• unified control principles – both parties of the water transfer must follow the 
law;  
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• clarified water rights – the seller must have a water abstraction permit  
• unified management – The Ministry of Water Resources, The YRCC, and 
Ningxia Water Resources Department must agree on management of the 
transfer; 
• sustainable use;  
• consultation with all parties democratically, openly, equally and fairly;  
• transfer with financial compensation;  
• combining government regulation with market mechanisms (WET 2006:157). 
 
Moreover, in accordance with the Ningxia Yellow River Water Rights Conversion 
Master plan, implementation of water rights transfer projects were supposed to make 
330 million m3 available to industries by 2010 and by the end of the second phase of 
the project in 2015, 494 million m3 made available. 53 industrial projects were 
planned to invest in water saving and transferring water rights from Qingtongxia ??
? East & West Irrigation Area and Weining ?? Irrigation Area. The initial water 
saving-transfer arrangement’s were based on the water that could be saved through 
canal lining in Qingtongxia and Weining Irrigation Area’s from the following 
irrigation schemes: Tanglai ?? irrigation area 97.1 million m3, West main ?? 
irrigation area 39.2 million m3, Huinong ?? irrigation area 51.5 million m3, Hanyan 
?? irrigation area 40.5 million m3, Qin ? irrigation area 66.3 million m3, Taimin ?
? and Daqing ?? irrigation areas 12.4 million m3, Qixing ?? irrigation area 17.9 
million m3, Yuejin ?? irrigation area 23.2 million m3, Zhongwei ?? irrigation area 
11.3 million m3 and Tangxi ?? irrigation area 134.5 million m3 (Ningxia Water 
Rights Transfer Feasibility Report 2011:2-3).  
In 2004, 3 enterprises were approved by the YRCC to invest 151 million yuan in water 
saving projects in the existing irrigation schemes in exchange for the rights for use of 
the 53,9 million saved water (Ibid:9). As of 2014, out of the 53 enterprises that have 
applied for the water-rights transfer programme only 8 got approval from the YRCC4. 
The designed total volume of water transferred is 88 million m3/year and the unilateral 
water transfer price used to be 3 yuan per cubic meter in 2003 but has gradually been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Appendix 3. 
27 
raised to 25 yuan per cubic meter (Official, Ningxia’s Department of Water Resources 
Governance, Interview March 17th 2014). The current price includes fees for: 
• A construction fee for the channel lining 
 
• Operation and Maintenance fee  
 
• Renovation fee  
 
• Compensation fee for Other users and for Ecology 
 
Once the fee’s are paid by the enterprise the Irrigation District Agency is responsible 
for maintaining the channel lining. However, all cost’s are not paid by the purchaser, 
the government also made some contribution to the channel lining. Out of the three 
original pilot projects – Ningxia Daba Power Plant, Maliantai Power Plant and Lingwu 
Power Plant – two thirds of the primary water rights transfer investments were done by 
the companies and one third by the local government (Circle of Blue 2011). Apart 
from reforming irrigation infrastrucutre to promote water conservation, the 
Government of Ningxia has also made air-cooling technology a required feature for all 
new coal-fired power plants, saving 75 to 85 percent of the water needed to cool a 
conventional coal-fired power plant (Official, Water Saving Office at Ningxia’s Water 
Resources Department, Interview March 18th 2014). 
 
	  
5.4	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  in	  Practice:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Field	  
           ”To establish a water rights market is basically an issue of power. It depends if the local 
government want to hold on or give use-rights to end users. As for now in Ningxia, its 
controlled by the local government and not a true market, its only water-transfer” 
(Professor, Tsinghua University, Interview March 25th 2014). 
 
While China’s water resource allocation system is a shift towards a right’s based 
approach to water management, including defining water entitilements at the farmer 
level within irrigation districts and initiating water trading projects, insights from the 
field in Ningxia have shown in practice that the water right transfer programmes are 
mainly driven by government and not a free market. Despite more than 10 years of 
developing a water rights trading system, reallocation of water is still limited to water 
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saved by engineering measures in the irrgation areas and water right transfer is limited 
in the same city district of Ningxia. In this context, a system of clearly defined, secure 
water rights provided to farmers to lay the foundation for a water rights trading market 
has not been put in place. Thus, individual farmers and water users associations are not 
involved in the water rights transfer framework to release water to industrial users. As 
an Official explained: 
 
”Water rights transfer is a risky process because it can undermine food production. At 
present, we are just saving water by repairing irrigation channels and no need to involve 
water user associations or farmers. On the other hand, since water is a constraint for our 
development and more water can only be released by improving agricultural water use, 
the next step should be to involve farmers. ” (Official, Water Saving Office at Ningxia’s 
Water Resources Department, Interview March 18th 2014). 
 
Although farmers and water user associations are not involved in the water rights 
transfer projects, the idea of reallocating water from agriculture to industry through 
investing in water savings has transferred water from low-valued to higher valued uses 
and to some degree helped reduce the burden of farmers by saving water and reducing 
farm costs. The agricultural water price for gravity irrigation is 0.012 yuan/m3 while 
the agricultural water price for pumping irrigation is 0.054 yuan/m3. After the 
implementation of the three first water transfer projects in Ningxia, calculations have 
shown - based on the existing gravity irrigation cost of 0.012 yuan/m3 - that farmers 
water expenditure has been reduced with 717 000 yuan annually due to improved 
water speed along the channels (Wang 2012:180). Moreover, up to now the channel 
lining in Qingtongxia East & West Irrigation Area’s has also improved water 
utilization coefficient of the channels from 0.4 to 0.6. As a result, about 40 % of the 
water is wasted compared to 60 % before the lining of irrigation channels were 
completed (Professor, China Institute of Water resources and Hydropower Research, 
Interview April 3th 2014). However, as in similar channel lining and water transfer 
projects being conducted in Inner Mongolia, water rights transfer in Ningxia has 
increased water use efficiency between users but irrigation remains inefficient. An 
Official confirms this: 
 
”Before the channel lining and water transfer projects the water that was wasted within 
irrigation districts were of no use for agriculture. The industry has made use of it now. 
The projects has given farmers benefits as well, such as saving time to get water to their 
farmland. But we have a long way to go before agriculture water use is really improved ” 
(Official, Ningxia’s Department of Water Resources Governance, Interview March 17th 
2014). 
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5.4.1.	  Third	  Party	  Impacts	  of	  Water	  Right	  Transfers	  
”Water rights transfer using market mechanisms in Ningxia and Inner Mongolia are 
practical solutions to meet the water resource demand in the energy sector. But how to 
determine water available for transfer or trading is risky. How about the ecological flow 
of the Yellow River Basin and how to expand water markets without increasing overall 
water use?” (Jia, Interview February 26th 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                          
On paper, tradable water rights are supposed to be embedded in a legal and 
institutional framework that can regulate external effects, such as to protect other users 
who might be affected by a transfer and to ensure minimum flows in a river for 
environmental protection. At present, however, the Ningxia experience highlights a 
number of issues that undermine the strength and effectiveness of channel lining and 
water rights transfers. In particular, when water is transferred there have been some 
negative impacts on third parties. Both surface and groundwater should be managed in 
an integrated way but in practice the implementation of water rights transfers have had 
some impacts on the groundwater system in Qingtongxia. As observed by an Official 
from the YRCC who has assessed the work in Ningxia: 
”The groundwater tables in Ningxia and Inner Mongolia are fragile. When you are lining 
the channels the water cannot enter the groundwater system and this have had negative 
effects on the grass and trees along the channels. To my mind the linkage between surface 
and groundwater has not been managed well in the transfer programmes” (Official, 
Department of Water Resources Management and Regulation, YRCC, Interview March 
4th 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                     
Little consideration to surface and groundwater connections is also raised by an 
Official in Ningxia: 
”It’s true we have had some problems with water transfers leading to reduced 
groundwater recharge but overall I dont think it's a serious problem. If it would be a 
serious problem we wouldnt continue with the programmes” (Official, Water Saving 
Office at Ningxia’s Water Resources Department, Interview March 18th 2014) 
 
Thus, it is possible that the water that was considered ”lost” through channel leakage 
and could be used for water-savings projects was in fact recharging groundwater. For 
each water-transfer contract a fee was made up of compensation for other users and 
ecology which demonstrates an awareness of taking third-party effects into account. 
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However, the impacts on the surface and groundwater linkages arising from water 
right transfer calls into question the effectiveness of using fees as an mechanism to 
address third party effects for large scale transfers. 
 
5.4.2. Water Consumption vs Clearly Defined Water Abstraction Targets 
As described on page 12-13, a robust water rights and transfer system depends on the 
consistency and integration of regional water rights, abstractor water rights and 
certificate-level rights. Thus, the key is to encourage as much transfer/trading of water 
rights as possible by issuing water abstraction licenses while at the same time 
constraining water consumption. At present, the Yellow River Water Resources 
Allocation plan do not define rights to water in a way that enables local Water 
Resources Bureau’s to issue water abstraction permits that will be in accordance with 
the grander scheme set by the river basin plan. In particular, the tributary water 
quantity allocations are not clearly defined meaning that provinces can extract water 
from tributaries of the Yellow River Basin before it enters the main stream (Moore 
2014). In this light, control over water permits from the tributaries of the main river is 
under the charge of local WRB’s while the YRCC can only reject or approve plans of 
abstraction from the main stream (Lohmar et al., 2003:7). As explained by an Official 
at the YRCC: 
”For the downstream – Henan and Shandong provinces – all the water abstraction 
approvals are issued by the YRCC. They have to come to the YRCC to apply their 
licenses. However, for the upper or middle part of the river, its more difficult because 
there are many tributaries. Certain amount of water is approved by local governments and 
certain amount of water is approved by us” (Official, Department of Water Resources 
Management and Regulation, YRCC, Interview March 4th 2014). 
 
Though the final approvals for the water transfer projects are under the YRCC, most 
authority is retained by local government since the YRCC’s main focus is to control 
overall water use that flows in and out from Ningxia. In Ningxia, the YRCC can with 
its regulatory mechanism ”the cross-section control-system” monitor the flows at the 
entry and exits points of Ningxia to make sure that Ningxia meet the 4 billion m3 
consumptive allowance. For example, if the volume of water that flows into Ningxia 
from Gansu is x billion m3, then the flow out from Ningxia to Inner Mongolia must not 
be less than (x-4) billion m3. However, in practice, there exist inconsistencies between 
the Yellow River Water Resources Allocation plan and abstraction permits in Ningxia. 
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Permits should be based on the consumptive allowance 4 billion m3 but this is not 
currently the case with permits, which are higher than the 4 billion allocated water 
volume. According to Ningxia’s Water Rights Transfer Report (2011) the average 
annual abstractive volume is 8.269 billion m3 for irrigations areas, which is more than 
double the 4 billion m3 water consumption target for the whole province.5 Though its 
common that provinces can abstract a larger volume than the actual water 
consumption volume as long as certain amount of water is returned to the system, the 
8.269 billion m3 for irrigation alone in Ningxia shows the inefficiency of the irrigation 
system and the challenge of achieving the control of 4 billion m3 water consumption 
volume. Moreover, a recent Environment & Energy Publishing report asserts that due 
to lack of monitoring the coal industries can use more water than allowed because the 
water saving projects that companies invest in are close to one stream, while their coal 
operations get water from another source (E&E 2013). As a result, the weak 
connection between the Yellow River Water Resources Allocation plan and 
abstraction permits in Ningxia pose a problem to the development of a water rights 
market. 
5.4.3. Management of Water Right Transfers 
The weak linkage between the Yellow River Water Resources Allocation Plan and 
actual water use in Ningxia is partly due to the institutional friction imposed by 
different governmental agencies. A unified management approach to water rights 
transfer between the YRCC, The Ministry of Water Resources and Ningxia Water 
Resources Department has been difficult to achieve because the YRCC lacks a process 
to get local information on water consumption and abstraction permits on a regular 
basis. Generally in China local authorities do not disclose to the River Basin 
Commissions data on existing hydrology and the annual amount of abstraction licenses 
that have been approved (Wei et al., 2011:961). The lack of coordination and 
information sharing is acknowledged by an official at the YRCC: 
 
”When we went to Qingtongxia ??? the local authorities had changed the location for 
channel lining without informing us. This caused difficulty because then we didn’t know 
if enough water can be saved through channel lining from that specific area. Normally it 
should be assessed by both the local water department and us before channel lining can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Appendix 4. 
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start” (Official, Department of Water Resources Management and Regulation, YRCC, 
Interview March 4th 2014). 
 
More importantly, there exist no legal definition or institutional arrangement’s within 
the River Basin Commissions that enables a commission to involve stakeholders from 
provincial, prefectural and county levels (Shen 2009:493). In Ningxia, Ningxia Water 
Resources Department has established a Co-ordination group for the water rights 
transfer projects with the Vice Governor of Ningxia Province as the chairman of the 
group. However, this co-ordination group is not a formal standing organisation and 
only has membership from different sectors in Ningxia (WET 2006:158). In this light, 
the YRCC has formal links with the Irrigation Management Bureau’s of Ningxia but 
weak coordination with the Department of Water Resources Governance, which has 
the main responsibility for examining and approving applications for the water-rights 
transfer projects. The weak coordination between the YRCC and Ningxia’s 
Department of Water Resources Governance is recognized by an official in Ningxia: 
”The YRCC are seldom here and we seldom conduct work with them. At present, they are 
mainly undertaking work with Irrigation Management Bureau’s” (Official, Ningxia’s 
Department of Water Resources Governance, Interview March 17th 2014). 
 
In this context, the lack of regular procedures for discussing and sharing information 
on hydrology and abstraction licenses granted to enterprises, particularly between the 
YRCC and the Department of Water Resources Governance, reflects the absence of a 
robust framework for managing water rights transfers and remains a constraint for 
developing a water rights market. 
 
5.5	  Summary	  
In reference to my main research questions that is guided by the analytical framework 
developed in the previous chapter, I will here sum up the findings from Ningxia (Table 
2). Interviews and secondary data suggest that the channel lining and water rights 
transfer projects as a policy option for addressing water scarcity has allowed the water 
to shift to the most productive and efficient users in Ningxia. At the same time, water 
rights are a requirement for a market-based water trading system but WUAs and 
farmers are not involved in the pilot projects and clearly defined and secure water 
33 
rights have not been provided to the end users while the government controls the full 
property rights over the entire water resources.  
In addition, my interviews indicate that the water rights transfer projects have 
improved water-use utilization coefficient of the channels in Qingtongxia ??? from 
0.4 to 0.6 and improved water speed along the channels to farmers land. However, the 
Ningxia experience also highlights structural problems that hampers the development 
of a robust water rights transfer market. These include: inconsistency and lack of 
integration between Yellow River Water Resources Allocation Plan and abstraction 
permits, lack of consideration to groundwater and surfacewater linkages, and lack of 
coordination and information sharing between the YRCC and Ningxia’s Water 
Resources Department. 
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Table 2. Analytical framework: Constraints on water rights 
trading       
Potential problem Mitigating strategy Ningxia   Results 
incomplete or poorly 
defined water rights (1,2) 
register and secure water 
rights 
1. How strong is the linkage 
of water allocation from the 
YRCC to the water permit at 
local level? 
Weak 
connection 
 
    2. Are water diversions to 
IMB, defined through 
permits issued by YRCC, 
clearly defined to WUAS? 
Water rights to 
WUAs and 
farmers are not 
clear     
Lack of infrastructure (3) investment in infrastructure 3. Is there a flexible 
infrastructure that allows 
transfer of water use-rights 
at low costs? 
Inadequate 
information     
     
Opposition from irrigation 
districts (4) 
strengthening and capacity-
building of WUAs 
4. What is the role of 
WUAs? Can farmers 
coordinate collective action 
through WUAs? 
At present 
WUAs have no 
role 
 
Third party effects (5) compensate third parties 
financed with levies on 
transcation 
5. is there a compensation 
system in place? Is 
groundwater managed in 
conjunction with surface 
water when irrigation water 
is transferred to industries? 
Compensation 
exist but the 
effectiveness to 
internalize 
externalities is 
questionable 
   
     
Imperfect or asymmetric 
information on water rights 
transfer (6) 
Lack of conflict resolution 
mechanisms (7) 
Strengthening and capacity-
building of WUAs, 
promoting stakeholder 
involvement 
6. Is there any framework 
for the exchange of 
information, mutual 
monitoring and frequent 
interactions? 
7. Is there a ’unified 
management’ approach to 
water rights transfer 
between the YRCC and 
Ningxia Water Resources 
Bureau? Is there lack of a 
institutional process within 
the YRCC? 
Informal forum 
with weak links 
to the YRCC  
 
  
Lack of 
coordination and 
information 
sharing         
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6.	  DISCUSSION	  
This chapter links the findings from Ningxia to the aim of the thesis, namely a better 
understanding of what factors facilitate or constrain market-based water rights 
allocation in the YRB. The findings will shed light on what can be learned from 
Ningxia’s experience with market-based instruments to water shortages in the YRB in 
an era of growing pressures on water resources from energy production and climate 
change.	  
6.1	  Ningxia’s	  Experience	  with	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  	  
New Institutional Economics (NIE) highlights the importance of institutions for 
creating effectively functioning markets. According to (NIE), institutional control over 
transaction costs enables or limits water markets to efficiently allocate water from 
low-valued to higher valued uses. One key strength with Ningxia’s water rights 
transfer schemes is their ability to transfer water from lower to higher value uses. The 
economies of scale in undertaking water efficiency measures that has been achieved 
with the channel lining and water rights transfer model in Ningxia is attributable to the 
institutional arrangements under which water is managed. All transfers have a cost and 
are linked to infrastructure transfer capabilities and the institutions governing various 
aspects of water transfer. These costs include: field-inspections and hydrological 
studies by the YRCC and Ningxia Water Resource Authority, constructing, operating 
and maintaining infrastructure to measure and transfer water; coordinating between 
central-local level, coordinating between buyer (enterprise) and seller (government), 
negotiating & enforcing contracts and other decision making costs. What makes 
Ningxia able to allocate water rights to their highest valued economic use is through 
lowering transaction costs by lining irrigation channels rather than devolving property 
rights over water resources to actors at lower levels of political organisation that give 
farmers rights and capacities to trade water. Transferring rights and capacities to 
farmers to take part in trading water involves high transaction costs due to high land 
fragmentation in China and may have discouraged the development of water markets 
at the farmer level in Ningxia.  
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The strength of the channel lining and water rights transfer model in Ningxia, however, 
is also its weakness. Transfers are embedded in a legal and institutional framework – 
which is determined by the 2002 Water Law, the 2006 Water Abstraction Regulation 
and the Yellow River Water Resources Allocation Plan sanctioned by the YRCC – 
that has left several theoretical principles unfulfilled such as: (1) the integration of the 
three levels of allocation as basis for water rights trading, (2) the definition of water 
rights to end-users, and (3) the recognition of environment as a legitimate user, 
particularly the hydrologic connectivity between groundwater and surface waters. 
While the channel lining and water rights transfer model has improved water-use 
utilization coefficient of the channels in Qingtongxia ??? from 0.4 to 0.6, the 
impacts on groundwater levels in some cases show that the leakage reduction 
programs through channel lining might not generate ”real” water savings. Hence the 
water rights transfer projects involve tradeoffs between economic efficiency and 
ecosystem protection. In addition, allocating a socially and physically interconnected 
resource to highest valued economic use at a time when more than a third of the rural 
population – about 1.5 million people – lack access to safe water, indicates that social 
equity is another weak point of the current framework (SEI 2014). 
The flaws in the performance of Ningxia’s water rights transfer system stems from 
two distinctive features of China’s water resources management which decisively 
shape water markets: asymmetric information and lack of cross-sectoral coordination. 
Under a three-tiered allocation system made by administrative decisions, transparency 
of water availability in each sector is a prerequisite for efficient inter-sectoral water 
transfers. However, asymmetric information, when one party lacks access to another 
party’s information, manifests itself in several ways both at the river basin and the 
local level through: limited disclosure of information and transparency regarding how 
water is allocated, the details of permits and the monitoring of water abstractions. The 
cost of imperfect or asymmetric information subsequent externalities and inefficiency 
is the result of insufficient knowledge about how much water is available. As a result, 
market distortions are created by informational gaps between the YRCC and Ningxia 
government over how to reconcile water abstraction permits with the 4 billion m3 
water consumption target. As Appendix 4 shows, the 8. 269 billion m3 for irrigation 
alone does not conform to the consumptive objective, leading Ningxia Water 
Resources Bureau – who has more control over hydrological and abstraction 
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information within their jurisdiction than the YRCC – to issue abstraction permits with 
little consideration to limit water consumption. Lack of transparency and information 
disclosure on water resources and water-related behaviors of various stakeholders not 
only raise the cost of defining tradable water rights but also pose obstacles of creating 
a more flexible water market. Consequently, the absence of formal mechanisms for 
inter-governmental consultation on hydrology and abstraction licenses as well as little 
institutional representation of stakeholders between the YRCC and Ningxia means that 
water available and consumed are not clear and establishing an efficient water rights 
market without a high degree of information about resource availability, and strong 
market oversight becomes difficult. 
 
Finally, asymmetric information and lack of coordination mechanisms embedded in 
China’s water resource management are constraints for developing a market-based 
water rights trading system. Under growing pressure for more flexible water-rights 
trading, the institutional framework is further likely to mirror greater difficulties to 
manage collective action challenges of exclusion and coordination that stem from 
balancing multiple goals: i) energy production vs food production, ii) tradeoffs 
between economic efficiency, equity and environmental water needs. As demand for 
water increases and pressure for inter-sectoral water-transfers rises, adaptation in the 
institutional design of water-transfers as a response to balance multiple goals will 
become more pressing. However, effective change in the existing institutional 
arrangement to a new institutional option involve transaction costs which need to be 
weighed against the benefits of balancing multiple goals. 
 
6.2	  The	  Future	  of	  Water	  Rights	  Trading	  in	  the	  Yellow	  River	  Basin	  
Agricultural water management is at the heart of China’s response to water scarcity in 
the 21st century. In an era of urbanization and expansion of large-scale industry, the 
challenge for the provinces along the YRB is to put in place a legal and institutional 
framework in which water can more contribute to economic growth than in the past 
whilst sustaining environmental outcomes. Driven by growing urbanization and 
industrialization, the energy sector will continue to expand and transboundary-water 
resource disputes over developing hydropower, coal, shale gas or oil will shape the 
allocation of water resources in the YRB. Coal-based thermal power capacity in Gansu, 
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Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia is expected to reach 290 GW in 2015 
compared with 145 GW in 2010, which is double in increased installed capacity 
(Provincial Governmental Reports 2011). Even with the mandatory implementation of 
air cooling technologies that reduce water consumption by 85 % for new power plants 
compared to closed-loop water technologies, these water saving technologies alone 
cannot decouple the future freshwater demand in the industrial sector. As economic 
development extends from the east-coast to the arid western provinces along the YRB, 
water resources pressures are likely to increase and pressure for tradable water rights 
to allocate water within and across productive sectors will likely continue to rise. Yet 
because the average water use efficiency is about 49 % for irrigation systems in the 
YRB compared to the national average of 47 %, there is plenty of room for pricing 
mechanisms and tradable water rights systems to improve water-use efficiency 
(National Irrigation Water Use Efficiency Measure and Analysis Report 2006). 
However, the effective functioning of pricing mechanisms and water rights trading 
systems depend on the presence of enabling conditions as clearly defined ownership 
rights and a well-functioning market (Chen et al., 2014:548). Overlooking this legal 
and institutional dimension while unleashing market forces will prove risky in an era 
of climate change.   
The results from a recent paper on the impacts of climate change on water stress 
situations in the YRB indicate that a small change in climate will result in a big change 
in irrigation water demand, or water surplus/deficit conditions. With little decrease in 
precipitation in 2030 and 2050 respectively, total irrigation water demand from both 
surface water and groundwater will increase due to the increase in evapotranspiration, 
by 14-15 % in future scenarios for 2030 and by 22 % in future scenarios for 2050 (J. 
Mu et al., 2013:554). Though various measures must work together to improve 
agricultural water use efficiency, the unwillingness of the government to increase 
farmers’ burdens has constrained the adoption of pricing mechanisms and made 
tradable water rights system a more attractive alternative (Chen et al., 2014:549). 
Moreover, as the experiences from Ningxia has shown, a greater push towards a water 
rights market would benefit from defining and securing water rights to end users; 
bringing water resources allocation plan and abstraction permits into closer alignment; 
establish formalized mechanisms for inter-governmental consultation between the 
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YRCC & other stakeholders; as well as developing mechanisms to hold localities 
responsible for meeting environmental flow requirements within their jurisdictions.	  
	  
7.	  CONCLUSION	  
In tackling the water scarcity problems in the Yellow River Basin, traditional 
command and control instruments have struggled to achieve their intended goals with 
closing the supply and demand gap, in part due to costly exclusion and collective 
action problems stemming from inter-jurisdictional competition over water resources. 
Reflecting these shortcomings, the Yellow River Basin Commission has initiated a 
number of water marketing strategies to induce Inner Mongolia and Ningxia to 
reallocate available supplies from agriculture to industries whilst adhering to water 
quotas allocated from the Yellow River Water Allocation Plan. Though studies have 
been made on transferring and trading water rights in Inner Mongolia, few studies 
have investigated Ningxia’s implementation of similar pilot projects. This thesis 
employs the case of Ningxia to address this empirical gap by examining factors that 
facilitate or hinder market-based water rights allocation in the YRB. 
The findings of this study suggest that the channel lining and water rights transfer 
model deployed by the YRCC as an incentive scheme has led the local government in 
Ningxia to increase the allocative efficiency of water between agriculture and industry 
since it conforms to Ningxia’s development priorities. At the same time, the expansion 
of Ningxia’s water rights transfer system has been made without involving WUAs and 
farmers and the water rights remain ambiguous as in the case of Inner Mongolia. In 
absence of a well defined property rights regime, the water rights transfer has led to 
third party impacts which indicate that there exist a tradeoff between economic 
efficiency and ecosystem protection. While these transfers have reallocated water to 
the most productive users, they do little to address structural problems that underlie the 
water rights transfer system.  
The flaws in Ningxia’s model, including inconsistency and lack of integration between 
the Yellow River Water Allocation Plan and abstraction permits; little consideration to 
groundwater and surface water linkages (ecological flows), stems from asymmetric 
information on hydrology and abstraction licenses and lack of coordination 
mechanisms embedded in China’s water resource management. The importance of 
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these barriers for market-based water-rights trading in the YRB are likely to increase 
as China move forward to close the development gap between the coastal and western-
inland with increasing pressure to reallocate water from agriculture to industry. 
Though increasing water prices yields water conservation benefits when irrigation 
water use efficiency is on average 49 % in the YRB, raising prices runs counter to 
raising rural incomes and grain self-sufficiency. Because of these social and political 
constraints, the development of water-rights trading will likely continue to be an 
attractive alternative to the adoption of water pricing mechanisms in meeting the 
industrial water demand without putting extra burden on farmers. 
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Appendix	  1:	  Informed	  Form?
?
调?问?  
?问???对?进????????“????”?????进?调????该
????过???进???为? 2? 3???实???,?图????????“
????”?实??????这项?????????赞?, ???????导
师? Dr. Stefan Brehm????问???访??????????进?专业?
?? 
 
1) ???“????”?实?????进??? 
2) ???????“????”项??  
- 现???????????????????????? 
- ??“????”试?项???资???? ??????????? 
3) “????”????????  
4) ???????业???????这??资??标?????  
5) ?????????????业??费???  
6) “???协?”????“????”????????  
7) “????”?????????对???资????????动?? 
- 节???资??转?给?业??????????????? 
8) ?“????”??时,?????证达??态?????? 
9) 总?????为?项????,“????”??对????过?????员?
规?????额???进?? 
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Questionnaire 
The purpose of this Master-thesis is to examine factors that facilitate or hinder water-
use rights trading market in Ningxia. By conducting fieldwork in China over a period 
of 2-3 months the aim of the research is to understand how water-rights trading work 
in practice in Ningxia. The research is sponsored by Lund University and my 
supervisor is Dr. Stefan Brehm at Lund University. If the respondent wishes to remain 
anonymous then professional secrecy is being held. 
 
1) How does water-use rights trading work in practice in Ningxia?  
2) How many water-trading projects exist?  
- How much water is traded annually?  
- What is the water rights trading investment for each pilot-project?    
- What is the price per cubic meter? 
3) What have been the strenghts and weaknesses of water-use rights trading? 
4) How are the enterprises that would be granted permits to the saved water 
selected? What are the criteria? 
5) How does the Local Water Authority in Ningxia collect water resource fees 
from the enterprises? 
6) What is the role of Water User Associations in the water-use rights trading in 
Ningxia? 
7) Has the water rights trading in Ningxia created incentives for more efficient 
use of water within irrigation districts?  
- Does irrigation remain inefficient when saved water is transferred to industries? 
8) How are ecological water requirements being met during water-use rights 
trading in Ningxia? 
9) Overall, has water rights trading as an policy-instrument induced Ningxia to 
not exceed their water quotas issued by the Yellow River Basin Commission? 
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Appendix	  2:	  Map	  of	  Ningxia	  
?
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Appendix	  3:	  Water	  Right	  Transfer	  Project’s	  in	  Ningxia	  
Nr Project Name Capacity (MW) 
Approved Water Transfer Projects 
Water Conversion 
(million m3) 
Irrigation Water 
Saving Areas 
1 
Lingwu 
Powerstation 2×600MW 14,4 
line 13,824 km of 
Tanglai main 
channels, 245,65 
km of distribution 
channels 
2 
Lingwu 
Powerstation 
Expansion 2×600MW 6,2 
line 8,2 km of East 
main channels, 30 
km of distribution 
channels 
3 Daba Powerstation 2×600MW 12 
line 32 km of 
Hanyan main 
channels, 142,4 km 
of distribution 
channels 
4 
Maliantai 
Powerstation 4×300MW 14,3 
line 25 km of 
Huinong main 
channels, 26,2 km 
of distribution 
channels 
5 
Shuidonggou 
Powerstation 2×600MW 6,2 
line 16km of 
Malian main 
channels, 66,2 km 
of distribution 
channels 
6 
Yuanyanghu 
Powerstation 2×600MW 6,2 
line 13,123 km of 
Daqing main 
channels, 30,8 km 
of distribution 
channels 
7 
Lingzhou 
Powerstation 2×135+2×600MW 18 
line 4,3 km of West 
main channels, 
27,9 km of 
distribution 
channels 
8 
Ningdong Baofeng 
Powerstation 2×600W 10,7 
line 13km of Qin 
main channels, 43 
km of distribution 
channels 
                                                                    
Total   88   
 Source: Ningxia Water Resources Department (2014) 
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Appendix	  4:	  Allocation	  of	  water	  diversion	  rights	  and	  water	  consumption	  in	  
irrigation	  districts	  in	  Ningxia	  that	  divert	  water	  from	  the	  YRB	  (100	  million	  m3)	  
?? ???? 95% 75% 50% 25% 
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 
?   ? 82.39  35.94  56.69  24.73  73.91  32.24  82.39  35.94  98.21  42.84  
?  ?????? 71.42  29.69  49.14  20.43  64.06  26.63  71.42  29.69  85.13  35.39  
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
??????? 43.11  18.68  29.66  12.85  38.67  16.75  43.11  18.68  51.39  22.26  
??? 14.22  6.16  9.78  4.24  12.75  5.53  14.22  6.16  16.94  7.34  
??? 10.67  4.51  7.34  3.10  9.57  4.05  10.67  4.51  12.71  5.38  
??? 7.35  3.09  5.06  2.13  6.59  2.77  7.35  3.09  8.76  3.68  
??? 6.61  2.94  4.55  2.02  5.93  2.64  6.61  2.94  7.88  3.50  
??? 1.93  0.76  1.33  0.52  1.73  0.68  1.93  0.76  2.30  0.91  
??? 1.42  0.67  0.98  0.46  1.27  0.60  1.42  0.67  1.69  0.80  
????? 0.93  0.55  0.64  0.38  0.83  0.49  0.93  0.55  1.11  0.66  
??????? 14.02  5.73  9.64  3.94  12.57  5.14  14.02  5.73  16.71  6.82  
????? 0.07  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.03  0.08  0.04  
?? 5.46  2.43  3.76  1.67  4.90  2.18  5.46  2.43  6.51  2.90  
?? 2.67  0.97  1.84  0.67  2.40  0.87  2.67  0.97  3.18  1.16  
??? 1.43  0.53  0.99  0.36  1.29  0.47  1.43  0.53  1.71  0.63  
??? 4.38  1.77  3.02  1.22  3.93  1.59  4.38  1.77  5.22  2.11  
? 
? 
? 
? 
???? 14.29  5.29  9.83  3.64  12.82  4.75  14.29  5.29  17.03  6.31  
??? 5.39  1.90  3.71  1.31  4.83  1.70  5.39  1.90  6.42  2.26  
??? 2.79  1.04  1.92  0.72  2.50  0.93  2.79  1.04  3.33  1.24  
???? 6.11  2.35  4.20  1.62  5.48  2.11  6.11  2.35  7.28  2.80  
 Source: Ningxia Water Rights Transfer Feasibility Report (2011:50) 
 
